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ABSTRACT
THOMAS LOEBER: Influence of Individual Income and Country-Level Inequality on
Values about Distributive Justice
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens.)
This paper explores how values about distributive justice vary with individual income and
country-level inequality. The most prominent model of this relationship, the Meltzer-
Richard model, predicts that higher inequality should make the rich more averse and the
poor more supportive of redistribution. However, most empirical studies have found the
opposite pattern. I try to adjudicate between two prominent explanations in the literature,
altruism versus inequality-induced fear of crime of rich individuals. Since the latter hy-
pothesis postulates that the rich only support redistribution for instrumental reasons, we
should find a different result if we ask them more abstract questions about distributive jus-
tice. Using data from the International Social Survey Program, I investigate this question
employing multilevel modeling. Because I find the same pattern than for the more instru-
mental questions about redistribution, I conclude that altruism is an important factor driv-
ing preferences for redistribution.
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INTRODUCTION
Different values about what constitutes distributive justice are one of the two major sources
of differences in political ideology. Although conflict about these issues today rarely takes
the violent form that class conflict sometimes took in the 19th and early 20th century, the
outcome of the struggle about these ideals still has enormous ramifications for the fate
of countries and the flourishing of their citizens. Understanding how people form these
values is thus of vital interest to political science. The issue is also connected to a broader
question about human nature: Are people fundamentally selfish, merely picking values
that maximize their own self-interest and then finding rationalizations for them, or are
humans capable of empathy and compassion, leading them to behave at least to some ex-
tent altruistically? Though a growing amount of empirical research clearly supports the
latter, as will be discussed in detail below, most models and political science are based
on the former, raising the question whether incorporating this finding will provide more
explanatory power. These are the questions I will investigate in this paper.
A consistent finding of the literature has been that, while the rich are less support-
ive of redistribution than the poor, the rich are in fact more supportive of redistribution
in more unequal countries contrary to what many of our theories suggest (e.g., Finersaas
2009). Two main explanations for this have been proposed for this: Firstly, some authors
have explained this by pointing to the negative externalities of higher inequality, in partic-
ular crime, which lead the rich be to less averse to redistribution (Rueda and Stegmueller,
forthcoming). Alternatively, it has been proposed that we need to jettison a widespread
assumption about actors behavior, namely pure self-interestedness (Dimick, Rueda and
Stegmueller 2014). Accordingly, the above puzzle would instead be due to the richs altru-
ism, which makes them more supportive of redistribution in more unequal environments.
Most studies to date have directly looked at peoples support for redistribution, but
unfortunately the observable consequences of both possible explanations are virtually
identical, making it impossible to adjudicate between these two theories. I attempt to solve
this problem by instead looking at peoples values about distributive justice. Moving to this
more abstract level should make the instrumental considerations of negative externalities
less salient, and thus allows me to take a more pristine look on the extent of egalitarian at-
titudes of the rich. I find the same pattern that previous authors have found for support for
distribution for egalitarian values: The rich hold considerably more egalitarian values in
more unequal countries. This supports the position that the richs values about distributive
justice are influenced by altruism.
THEORY
Self-interested and altruistic behavior
Many social science theories about human behavior can be group into one of two
categories: Those that treat humans as purely self-interested, and those that see human
behavior as motivated at least in part by altruism.1 The former have their origin in enlight-
enment liberalism, eventually becoming predominant in economics. From there they grad-
ually spread to political science, especially after explanations focusing on political culture
started to fall out of favor in the 1970s.
The latter approach has long been an implicit part of social science explanations, but
altruism only became an explicit focus recently. The background for this has been a num-
ber of developments in evolutionary biology: It has long been known that many animal
species have an inborn tendency for altruism, such as the social insects (e.g., honeybees
and ants), where a great proportion of individuals are sterile, foregoing spreading their
own genes to help their sisters in their reproduction. Around half a century ago, evolu-
tionary biologists started developing mathematical models that were able to explain why
evolution does not always create purely self-interested animals. These focused on kin se-
lection, group selection, and multilevel selection (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Dawkins
1Of course, some theories might stay agnostic about this question, but these are usually theories that
only focus on the macro-level, and thus are not about human behavior.
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1976, Wilson and Sober 1994, Sober and Wilson 1998).
These above studies do not, of course, show that humans do in fact possess these
altruistic behavioral tendencies; rather, they imply that humans could potentially possess
these behavioral tendencies if the right circumstances prevail during their evolutionary his-
tory. It is indeed plausible that this was the case, because the survival and eventual dom-
inance over the planet of our species depended to a large extent on cooperation between
groups of individuals, which is much easier to achieve if it occurs not only for instrumen-
tal reasons. Furthermore, the development of inequality aversion is likely to have been
conducive to an individuals genes transmission, because it is a mechanism that prevents a
person from being taken advantage of.
Ultimately, however, the question of whether humans do exhibit altruistic behavioral
tendencies is an empirical question that is best studied experimentally, because outside
the lab it is usually impossible to ascertain whether a perceived altruistic behavior was not
caused by ulterior motivations (e.g., whether the generous donor was really motivated by a
desire for social recognition). These studies generally do in fact reveal considerable altru-
istic behavior: For instance, most experimental subjects playing the dictator game do not
take advantage of the other person, even in a one-shot interaction with a random stranger
whom they never get to meet.2 Likewise, the public goods game reveals that most people
are willing to contribute to the public good rather than to free-ride, as long as most other
peoples do so as well. One reason that such cooperation can often be sustained is that
most people are willing to pay a cost to punish free riders, even if their own personal gain
in doing so is negligible. In fact, even outside observers are generally willing to punish
cheaters at their own cost, even though they have nothing to gain. This has been termed
conditional cooperation (Fehr and Gintis 2007) and has also been shown to have important
implications for the legitimacy of different welfare state arrangements (Fong et al. 2006).
In addition, the case for conceiving of altruism as an evolutionary adaption is strength-
2In this game, one person divides up the sum of money between him-or herself and another person. (By
contrast to the ultimatum game, the recipient does not have the option to decline this deal.) Thus, a purely
self-interested individual should never give anything to the other person in a one-shot game if the game is
anonymous.
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ened by the fact that the tendency for altruistic behavior in humans is correlated with
particular brain structures (e.g., Mathur et al. 2010, Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2009). These
structures are likely to be the mechanisms through which evolution transmits altruism or
to be precise, the DNA sequences that code for these structures are the likely transmission
mechanism.
Of course, this does not mean that humans always act completely unselfishly; the
conditions under which they act selfishly and the conditions under which they do not are
an important frontier of current research. Some conditions have already been identified:
Firstly, the research on conditional altruism summarized above showed that most people
stop behaving altruistically if free riders are not punished.3 This makes sense, because
it prevents people from being taken advantage of. Secondly, people tend to behave more
altruistically towards members from their in-group rather than out-group, though what
constitutes in-group versus out-group is socially constructed (Bloom 2013). Finally, the
activation of the emotion of has been found to impede empathy, and thus altruism. As a
result, political entrepreneurs resorting to racism often try to elicit this emotion about the
respective outgroup.
I also do not want to assert that all humans exhibit this tendency for altruism; in-
deed, the more individuals in the population exhibit this trait, the greater the potential
benefit for free-riders (in the terminology of biology: parasites). This indicates that there
might be an equilibrium level of altruistic and selfish individuals (which, of course, de-
pends in part on external factors such as monitoring and enforcement institutions). Fehr
and Gintis (2007) empirically estimates in their public goods games that about 30% of
the population are free riders, 50% are altruistic, and 20% pursue intermediate strategies.
However, when the stakes are higher, few humans are willing to pursue their own self-
interest without any regard to the cost of others, because of the inborn human capacity
to feel empathy and compassion with others. People who lack this capacity, and are thus
only able to cooperate with others for anticipated future gain a central feature of the homo
3This is different from saying that most people stop cooperating if free riders are not punished. This
could merely mean that cooperation was due to self-interested reasons in the first place.
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economicus are what psychologists call psychopaths (Bloom 2013).
Altruism and preferences for redistribution
Let me stress that what I want to demonstrate in this paper is not that humans often
behave altruistically this is best studied experimentally, and has long been proven beyond
reasonable doubt; rather, what I want to argue is that taking this into account will give po-
litical scientists more predictive theories. I will apply this (meta-)theory to one specific
empirical puzzle: failure of models relying on pure self-interest (such as the Meltzer-
Richard model) to correctly predict the relationship between individual income, coun-
try level inequality, and support for government redistribution. These models make two
predictions: Firstly, the rich should be less supportive of redistribution. This is generally
confirmed, but only partially: Though this relationship is generally be found to be statisti-
cally significant (e.g., Finersaas 2009), the effect size is rather dismal. Though there are of
course significant challenges in measuring the theoretically relevant variable, discounted
lifetime income (what economists call permanent income), which biases the effect down-
wards, the explained variance is so small that it seems that there are many other more im-
portant factors driving this attitude. Fong (2001) examined the number of alternative ex-
planations that proponents of the homo economicus approach have given for this small
effect size, and concludes that self-interestedness alone cannot account for the observed
pattern.
In this paper, however, I will mainly be concerned with a challenge to a second
prediction of the homo economicus model: The prediction that the rich should be more
averse to redistribution in more unequal countries, because they have more to lose in this
context. A number of recent studies have uniformly disconfirmed this: While the rich tend
to be less supportive of redistribution in almost all countries, this polarization around in-
come is actually greater in more equal countries (Finersaas 2009, Rueda and Stegmueller
forthcoming, Dimick et al. 2014). Furthermore, these authors find that most of this varia-
tion comes from the preferences of the rich: While the poor tend to be equally supportive
of redistribution independent of country-level inequality, it is the preferences of the rich
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that vary with inequality (ibid).
Two major explanations have been proposed for this pattern: Stegmueller and Rueda
(forthcoming) argue that the rich may have self-interested reasons to be more supportive
of redistribution in more unequal countries if we take the negative externalities of inequal-
ity into account. In particular, they focus on fear of crime, using regional-level data from
the European Social Survey. They find that individuals who are more afraid of crime are
more supportive of redistribution, and that the effect of macro-inequality on preferences
for redistribution becomes insignificant (though still sizable) once including fear of crime
into the regression (controlling for some potentially confounding regional variables such
as urbanization and health of the economy).
The second major explanation is altruism on part of the rich. In their work in progress,
Dimick, Rueda, and Stegmueller (2014) look at within-state changes in inequality over
time, and find that while these do not affect preferences for redistribution of the poor,
increases in inequality make the rich more supportive of redistribution. Unfortunately,
however, this empirical strategy does not allow us to rule out the fear-of-crime hypothesis.
Although I do agree that fear of crime can make the rich more supportive of redis-
tribution than they would otherwise be, I find it unlikely that it would have such a huge
effect. While the study does control for a number of potentially confounding regional co-
variates, fear of crime might be an indicator of living in an area with salient social prob-
lems, and this individual-level indicator might be more precise in picking up this personal
experience of social problems than the regional-level measure of inequality is (since there
is considerable within-region variation in inequality). In other words, it is possible that
fear of crime, though no doubt influenced by personality characteristics, is a better indica-
tor of an individuals exposure to inequality than the regional-level inequality data. If this
is the case, the significance of the fear of crime variable does not necessarily mean that it
is indeed fear of crime rather than altruism caused by the personal expense of social prob-
lems that is causal.
As the authors themselves concede, there are also theoretical reasons to be skepti-
cal about the fear of crime argument: It might be cheaper for the rich to invest in personal
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security services rather than to pay higher taxes. But more importantly, as outlined above,
the experimental literature has clearly shown that this trait plays an important role in hu-
man behavior, which increases our confidence that it may indeed be altruism that drives
the empirical pattern.
Values about distributive justice
I try to adjudicate between these two rival explanations by investigating peoples val-
ues about distributive justice. The studies summarized above, like most of the literature,
look only at a single item that asks people whether the government should redistribute in-
come from the rich to the poor. The answer to this question will be a combination of both
normative considerations about distributive justice, as well as more instrumental calcula-
tions about the effects of such policies, e.g. on crime. I hypothesize that, if it is a purely
self-interested consideration of externalities that drives the richs higher support for redis-
tribution in more unequal countries, then we should see a different pattern if we instead
look only at their values about distributive justice: In particular, I will look at three egal-
itarian values (to what extent income should be distributed according to the principles of
equity, equality, and need) and two inegalitarian values (to what extent income should be
distributed according to the two meritocratic principles of ability and effort). My focus
will be the analysis of the egalitarian values. Before I describe these expectations in more
detail, let me briefly summarize the theory underlying my choice of these five values.
While distributive justice is a major concern for political philosophers (most fa-
mously, Rawls 1971), political scientists have been more concerned with concrete atti-
tudes, such as the aforementioned one about government redistribution. Much of the em-
pirical research that has been done on values about distributive justice takes an experimen-
tal approach and is thus less concerned with how these values vary within a representative
sample of the population, or even across countries. Rather, they have focused on the more
foundational question of how people reason about distributive justice, e.g. whether they
use a mix of different principles and how they make trade-offs (e.g.,Frohlich and Oppen-
heimer 1992, Mitchell et al. 1993, Scott et al. 2001, Michelbach et al. 2003). These stud-
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ies found that people use a combination of principles: equality, need, merit, and efficiency.
Most importantly for our purposes, participants were willing to trade off a lot of efficiency
for equality, but this trade-off was mediated by assumptions about merit (the more merito-
cratic a hypothetical society was described, the more participants were willing to trade off
inequality for efficiency), especially for women. Furthermore, while it proved to be chal-
lenging to experimentally manipulate need independently of equality, need does seem to
have an independent effect, especially again for women.
Aalberg (2003) turns to public opinion research to investigate how these same values
vary across countries and how they covary with various sociodemographic characteristics,
but her study is limited in that she only looks at bivariate correlations. Presumably in part
as a result of the great number of correlations she assembles, she has trouble condensing
these descriptive findings into any general conclusions. Thus, I pair her focus on egalitar-
ian and meritocratic values with the more sophisticated empirical work about how indi-
vidual income and country have level inequality influences preferences for government
redistribution.
Hypotheses
If people are purely self-interested, the rich should be less supportive of the egali-
tarian distributive principles of need, inequality, and equity: Supporting these would be
to admit especially in unequal countries that their own preeminent status is unjust, i.e.
that they have more than they deserve, possibly even implying that something should be
done to alleviate this injustice. Thus, it would be rational for a purely self-interested rich
individual to rationalize the existence of any unfairness in order to avoid the associated
psychological costs, for instance by blaming the poor for their own poverty. Indeed, there
is a plethora of evidence in psychology that humans are willing to go to great length to ra-
tionalize inconvenient truths. The greater inequality, the more the rich have to lose from
egalitarianism; therefore, the polarization around these values should be greater in more
unequal countries.
Conversely, it would be rational for a purely self-interested rich person to identify
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strongly with the two meritocratic values of distributing income according to ability and
effort. In conjunction with the rationalizing belief that they themselves are at the top of
society because they are gifted and hard-working, subscribing to these meritocratic values
makes the world seem just for the rich, and they do not have to feel guilty about their priv-
ileges. Again, the greater inequality, the greater the incentive for the rich to rationalize this
inequality as meritocratic; thus, we should see a greater polarization around these values
in more unequal countries.
By contrast, if individuals are motivated at least in part by altruistic considerations
which is what I argue we should observe a different pattern: Since rich individuals in un-
equal countries are confronted with more inequality, inequity (unequal opportunities of the
poor and minorities), and need (poverty) than they would be confronted with if they lived
in more equal countries, this is going to trigger compassion for the disadvantaged. In turn,
this will make them more supportive of egalitarian principles of distributing income. Since
for the poor self-interest and altruism point in the same direction, inequality should have
a smaller impact on their values compared to the rich’s values. Overall, thus, polarization
around egalitarian and meritocratic values should be lowest in the most unequal countries
and highest in the most equal countries.
Note that I’m not arguing that individuals are exclusively motivated by altruism,
but that their motives are a mixture of self-interest and altruism. If self-interest played
no role at all, income should have no effect on values about distributive justice; these
values should only be influenced by inequality (since people would then only consider
sociotropic factors): The higher inequality, the more support for egalitarian and the less
support for meritocratic values. While a nonsignificant effect of income would be a very
strong support for my theory, I do not expect altruism to go that far. Rather, I expect both
self-interest and altruism to determine values about distributive justice:
H1: Inequality should have a bigger effect on the values of the rich than the val-
ues of the poor: Support for equality, equity, and need will decline with income, but this
decline will be smaller in more unequal countries. Consequently, polarization around in-
come should be higher in more equal countries.
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Furthermore, while we would ideally hope that asking people about these norma-
tive ideals should lead them to ignore instrumental calculations about the externalities of
inequality, it is conceivable that thinking about distributive justice will unconsciously acti-
vate neural networks about crime if this is an important externality consideration for them.
However, we can hypothesize that abstract questions about distributive justice activate
these networks less than the direct questions about peoples preferences for government re-
distribution. Thus, the effect of inequality on increasing the egalitarian values of the rich
should be bigger than the effect of inequality on increasing the richs preferences for redis-
tribution. By contrast, if it is crime rather than altruism that drives the preferences of the
rich, we should see the opposite.
H2: Inequality should increase class polarization around egalitarian values more
than it increases class polarization around preferences for redistribution.
The opposite pattern is likely to hold regarding meritocratic values: On the one
hand, the rich will be more supportive of meritocratic values, because this helps them ra-
tionalize their preeminent position in society. On the other hand, this tendency is curbed
in more unequal countries by the compassion for the poor that the personal encounter of
poverty triggers.
H3: Rich individuals will be more supportive of the two meritocratic principles
(ability and effort), but this effect will be more pronounced in more equal countries.
DATA, MODEL, AND METHODS
Dependent variables
I will test this theory using data from the International Social Survey Programs
(ISSP) module on social inequality. This module was implemented in four different years
1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009 and covers 27 countries.
For three of the five principles of distributional justice I will examine, I am able to
create an index of multiple items; the remaining two are measured by a single item. I com-
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pute each index by summing the respective items, and then divide by the number of items.
The advantage of this averaging is that the scale remains comparable between different in-
dices, independent of how many items an index contains. Thus, the marginal effects in the
OLS regression can be interpreted as the effect measured on the original 1-5 scale that a
one unit change in the independent variable is likely to have on each of the different items
that make up the index.
Most of my items stem from a battery of questions that ask the respondents how im-
portant a given factor should be in deciding pay. The answer options are: essential (coded
5), very important, fairly important, not very important, or not important at all (coded 1).
Below is a list of each of the principles for distributing resources and the items used to
master each:
• Ability is measured from the following three items in terms of how each should be
used to determine pay: the importance of how well the person does the job, job re-
sponsibility, and whether the job requires supervising others.4
• Effort is measured from the following two items in terms of how each should be
used to determine pay: how hard people work, and the number of years spent in ed-
ucation and training.5
• Need is measured by two items: whether needing to support a family, and whether
having children to support should be important in determining pay.6
4Exact question wording: ”In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each of
these things be, in your opinion
How well he or she does the job how important should that be in deciding pay?
How much responsibility goes with the job?
Whether the job requires supervising others?”
5Exact question wording: ”In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each of
these things be, in your opinion
The number of years spent in education and training?
How hard he or she works at the job?”
6Exact question wording: ”In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each of
these things be, in your opinion
... What is needed to support a family?
... Whether the person has children to support?”
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Fig. 1: Descr. stat.: support for distributing resources according to ability
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Fig. 2: Descr. stat.: support for distributing resources according to effort
• Equality is measured by a single item: whether it is right or wrong that people with
higher incomes can buy better healthcare.7 This is a less demanding conceptual-
7Exact question wording: ”Is it just or unjust right or wrong that people with higher incomes can buy
better health care than people with lower incomes?”
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Fig. 3: Descr. stat.: support for distributing resources according to need
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Fig. 4: Descr. stat.: support for distributing resources according to equality
ization of the value of equality than other authors have used. For example, Aal-
berg (2003) uses an item from the World Value Survey that asks whether it is just
or unjust if one secretary, who is quicker, more efficient, and more reliable at her
job than another secretary, is paid a specified amount more than the other secretary.
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The problem with this operationalization is that the respondents have to label this
as either just or unjust, with no intermediate possibilities. The reason I think this
is too demanding an understanding of egalitarianism is because even from an egal-
itarian perspective it may be viewed as just if there is a small pay difference; the
disagreement between more and less egalitarian minded citizens is instead likely to
center around how much of a pay difference is warranted. The ISSP actually con-
tains questions about how much the respondent thinks specific occupations should
earn, and from this it would be possible to construct a better measure of egalitar-
ianism by looking at the pay ratio of different occupations the respondent deems
appropriate. I plan to compute this measure for future versions of this paper.
• Equity is measured by the item whether it is right or wrong that people with higher
incomes can buy better education for their children.8 In essence, this question is
about whether it is unjust if a societys institutions give unequal chances to chil-
dren from different social classes (assuming that the respondent understands that
the quality of education influences a persons life chances.) Other authors have con-
ceptualized equity very differently: For instance, Aalberg (2003) conflates it with
what I have above called the principle of distributing resources according to effort
and ability.
• In addition, I replicate the results from a typical study from the literature on the
preferences over economic redistribution (e.g., Finersaas 2009), which uses an item
that asks whether the government should reduce income differences.9 Note that this
asks for absolute redistribution, not relative to the status quo: A number of stud-
ies have mistakenly used relative questions such as whether the government should
redistribute more to measure absolute preferences for distribution. This leads to sup-
port for redistribution being underestimated in countries that already redistribute a
8Exact question wording: ”Is it just or unjust right or wrong that people with higher incomes can buy
better education for their children than people with lower incomes?”
9Exact question wording: ”It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. (Strongly agree through strongly disagree)”
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Fig. 5: Descr. stat.: support for distributing resources according to equity
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Fig. 6: Descr. stat.: support for government redistribution
lot, such as the Scandinavian countries. I avoid this bias by relying on questions that
ask for absolute support. (The same is true for the items I use to measure the values
about distributive justice, which ask the respondents about their support for distribu-
tional principles that are not relative to the countrys current institutions.) Note also
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that while all the above questions are normative in the sense that they are should-
questions, i.e. about how the world should be rather than how it is this last question
is likely to be influenced in addition by more pragmatic considerations, such as con-
siderations of how positive or negative externalities of government redistribution
affect the respondents self-interest.
Independent variables
Country-level inequality is operationalized as the Gini coefficient of the countrys
pre-tax income distribution. The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of (income) in-
equality but obviously condensing a whole distribution into one single measure inevitably
loses information. In particular, Piketty (2014) suggests using alternative measures that
are better able to reflect inequality of top (1%, .1%) incomes. While I plan to test whether
this has any explanatory power for my present purposes in future versions of this paper,
top incomes seem less relevant for my main variables of interest then overall inequality,
because the most salient comparisons on citizens minds are likely to center around the
pay differences they observe in their daily experience, such as between ordinary low-wage
jobs compared to high-wage jobs such as doctors or lawyers. An exception might be the
subset of post-Leninist countries in which the discussion about oligarchs has entered the
public sphere. However, among the countries in my sample this is only the case for Rus-
sia. The rationale for using inequality of pre-tax income is that this is the starting point for
redistribution; instead looking at post-tax-and-transfer income is likely to introduce bias.
The data come from Fred Solts Standardized World Inequality Database (SWIID). While
he provides multiple imputations, I simply use the average for each country-year. Most of
the countries in my data set are developed countries, for which his estimates have a small
variance anyway. Thus, the standard errors of my regressions should be underestimated
only slightly.
One downside of the SWIID data is that they include retirees, which leads to a bi-
ased estimation of inequality: Because people tend to save less for retirement in more gen-
erous welfare states, where they can expect to receive more generous pensions, pre-tax-
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and-transfer inequality is overestimated here (Gornick and Milanovic 2015). The OECD
provides data for pre-tax-and-transfer inequality of the working age population, but these
data are not available for most country-years. Since inequality is a slow-moving variable,
it would be possible to interpolate the missing values using multiple imputation. I plan to
redo this analysis using these data in the future, but I am still confident in the validity of
my current findings due to the fact that, when taking preferences for distribution as my de-
pendent variable, I find the same pattern as Finersaas (2009) and Dimick et al.(2014), who
rely on post-tax-and-transfer income. This measure suffers from a different bias, but since
this bias is likely to be unrelated to the bias in pre-tax-and-transfer income, the fact that
we find the same result suggests that this result is not driven by the biases in inequality
measures.
I operationalize individual income as the (within-country) z-score of the household
income per equivalent adult. To do so I first compute an individuals equivalent income by
dividing household income by the square root of the number of household members. This
transformation is designed to take the economy of scale of the household into account, i.e.
that the cost of financing a given consumption possibility per household member rises less
than linearly as the number of household members increases. This is important because
the variable of theoretical interest is not the amount of money per se that enters a persons
bank account per month, but the consumption possibilities (and associated lifestyle) that
this amount of money affords. The second step is to standardize this variable by subtract-
ing the country mean and then dividing by the standard deviation, in order to make the
incomes of people living in different countries comparable. The resulting relative income
is an appropriate measure of a persons position in the economic hierarchy which is the
theoretical concept we are interested in.
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Income (z-score) -2.45 -0.46 0.00 -0.00 0.14 26.89
Inequality (demeaned) -16.51 -4.24 1.00 0.00 3.36 9.22
Table 1: Descr. stat. of important independent variables
I further control for important sociodemographic variables: Education is similar to
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individual income in that it is a component of social status, but for my present purposes
I consider it primarily as a control variable. I originally planned to measure it in years,
but the descriptive statistics of this variable look flawed (there are a number of individuals
with very high values (up to 81), and in addition some individuals are coded simply as
still students, for whom a value would need to be imputed if you do not want to drop these
observations (we do not even know whether they are high school or university students).
Thus, I instead use the highest completed degree (measured in six categories), which does
not suffer from the above problems. Though it is technically an ordinal variable, I treat
it as an interval-level variable by using it as a linear control variable. This is warranted
because I already have a large number (18) of explanatory variables, so I want to avoid
creating five more by adding a dummy variable for each education level.
Gender is another important variable that can be expected to influence preferences:
Firstly, women are socialized to be more caretaking, which makes them more supportive
of egalitarian values. Secondly, in part as a result of the former, women are much more
likely to work in caretaking professions, exacerbating the former effect. Furthermore, this
makes them more likely to be state employees, and as a result makes them more support-
ive of state intervention in general and redistribution in particular (Huber and Stephens,
2001).
Likewise, age has been found to be an important determinant of redistributive pref-
erences: The closer someone is to retirement, the bigger ones interest in government re-
distribution, since in most countries a large proportion of government spending goes to the
elderly. While this effect of age arises out of pure self-interest, there are also reasons to
expect that values about distributive justice vary with age: Firstly, people might rational-
ize this self-interest by identifying with the appropriate values. Secondly, the young have
been found to hold more egalitarian values. Thirdly, cohort effects have been found with
regard to political ideology, which we can expect to carry over to values about distributive
justice. Since I do not expect age to have a linear effect, I also include a quadratic term. I
measure age in decades, because this square term would otherwise become much larger
than the other regressors, which led to problems in the convergence of the maximum like-
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lihood estimator.
I also control for marital status and employment status because, like age, they lead
people to have different interests regarding social policy. Again, the resulting material
interests may both be rationalized through subscribing to different values about distribu-
tive justice. Furthermore, these variables also lead to different life experiences, which
are likely to affect these values. The baseline for marital status is married, and I include
dummy variables for widowed, divorced, separated, and single. The baseline category for
employment status is employed, and I include dummy variables for unemployed, student
or vocational training, retired, housewife/man, permanently discipled/sick, and other.
By contrast to many other studies that analyze the preferences for economic redistri-
bution, I do not control for skill specificity, because I do not find the available measures to
be convincing indicators of an individuals labor market risk.
Model
I use multilevel modeling with varying intercepts for countries and years. The mod-
els take the following form:
V alue = β0 +β1 ∗RelativeIncome+β2 ∗ Inequality+β3Income ∗ Inequality+
β4∗Female+β5∗Age+β6∗Age∗Age+β7∗Widowed+β8∗Divorced+β9∗Separated+
β10∗Single+β11∗Education+β12∗Unemployed+β13∗Student+β14∗Retired+β15∗
Housewife/man+β16∗Disabled+β17∗OtherEmploymentStatus+αcountry+αyear+ε
The advantage of using multilevel modeling is that, by contrast to fixed-effects mod-
els, I can include explanatory variables that are (near-)constant across time. While in-
equality is not perfectly constant, it is sufficiently slow-moving that there is not much
within-country variation over the time period I am studying, which would make our es-
timates very imprecise. The downside of multilevel models is that, since they are sim-
ply random-effects models, they bring with them the assumption that the unit effects (the
country- and year-specific error terms) are uncorrelated with any of the explanatory vari-
19
ables. This potential problem is not widely discussed in the empirical political science
literature relying on these models, in part because any resulting bias from a violation of
this assumption is usually small. There are ways to correct for this potential correlation,
but are not widely used since they are not implemented in the standard statistical packages
yet.
Method
I estimate this model using the lmer package in R, a maximum likelihood estimation
for mixed-effects models. The fact that my dependent variable can only take on five dis-
crete values suggests that it would be preferable to use an ordered logit or probit model.
Unfortunately, however, the estimation of multilevel ordered models is not implemented
in R yet, presumably because of the computational intensity, which makes a Bayesian ap-
proach preferable. However, since my dependent variable takes on five different values, a
linear model should not be too far off.
FINDINGS
The results from the regression can be found in tables 2 and 3 in the appendix, 10
and figures 6 through 12 graphically illustrate the effect of our two main variables of in-
terest. In the following, I will focus mainly on the figures, since these give a more mean-
ingful picture of the effect size. They show how the effect of income on values about dis-
tributive justice differs in equal and unequal countries. To generate these predictions, I set
inequality to both the lowest (thin black line) and highest (thick red line) observed value
that occurred in my sample. These predictions are for a typical individual in an average
10Note that, since both relative income and inequality (the demeaned Gini coefficient) have a mean of 0,
the coefficients on each of these two variables can be interpreted as the marginal effect of that variable when
the other variable is held at its mean. Likewise, the significance level of each of the two variables can be
interpreted as the significance level of its effect when the other variable is held at its mean. For our purposes,
this is not what we are primarily interested in: Though all significant, the effect sizes at the mean are so
close to 0 that they are theoretically uninteresting. What we would rather like to know is whether the values
diverge significantly for the rich, because only here does the effect size become substantial. This can best be
seen in the figures (citation).
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country and year.11 The 95% confidence intervals were computed by simulation.12
The rug plot at the bottom of each graph shows the distribution of income; it indi-
cates that most respondents income lies between -3 and +10 standard deviations of the
mean income. While I plotted predicted support for the whole income range, the huge ef-
fect sizes at the maximum income (around 26 standard deviations above the mean) should
be interpreted with caution, since there are relatively few data points above around 12).
Before I look at each of the six values in turn, I want to note one general pattern:
While the poor have similar preferences and values in equal and unequal countries, it
is primarily the preferences and values of the rich that diverge in these two scenarios.
Stegmueller and Rueda (2014) noted the same pattern for preferences for government
redistribution, but the fact that it generalizes to values about distributive justice greatly
increases our confidence in this finding. This implies that a theory explaining this pattern
should focus on the preferences and values of the rich. This is the case for the theory I
espouse, which concentrates on how inequality triggers altruism: Since for the poor the
effects of self-interest and altruism are not in conflict with each other (both promote egal-
itarian values and preferences), the fact that inequality triggers altruism should thus have
little impact on their preferences and values. By contrast, for the rich the effects of self-
interest and altruism go in the opposite direction; therefore, if inequality triggers altruism,
inequality should primarily change the preferences and values of the rich. The fact that I
find that it is primarily the values of the rich that respond to inequality therefore provides
some preliminary support for my theory. Let us now look at each of the values about dis-
11I set the dummy variable for female to the proportion of women in the sample; the other categorical
variables were set to their mode (employment status to employed, and marital status to married). I set all
other variables to their mean. The random intercepts for country and year were set to their median, which
was very close to zero.
121000 estimates of the model’s parameters were drawn from a multivariate normal distribution, using
the estimated variance-covariance matrix. Then, a prediction for an average individual (see above) is com-
puted from each parameter estimate, and the 95% confidence interval is computed using the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentile of these 1000 estimates.
The normality assumption is justified because a maximum-likelihood estimator is asymptotically nor-
mally distributed, and my sample size is very large. Bootstrapping would allow relaxing this normality
assumption, but is even more computationally intensive, making it impractical for large multilevel models
such as this one. Note that it is not necessary to compute panel-corrected standard errors for a multilevel
model, since this approach already models correlated error terms (Gelman and Hill 2006).
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tributive justice in turn.
Figure 7 reproduces the results from other studies such as Stegmueller and Rueda
(ibid.) and Finersaas (2009): It shows that, consistent with the homo economicus assump-
tion, richer individuals prefer less government redistribution; but inconsistent with that
model, the absolute value of the marginal effect of income is actually smaller in more un-
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Fig. 7: Effect of individual income and country-level inequality on support for government redis-
tribution. The original scale ranges from 5 (strong support) through 1 (strong opposition).
Inequality is set to the minimum (black thin line) and maximum (red thick line) observed
in the sample. Employment status is set to employed, marital status is set to married, the
dummy variable for female is set to the proportion of women in the sample. All other vari-
ables are set to their mean. The rug plot at the bottom shows the distribution of income.
Confidence intervals were computed by simulation and exclude the variation of the error
term and random effects for country and year.
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equal countries (i.e., the rich are less averse to redistribution in more unequal countries).
The effect size is also substantial: A person with an income of 12 standard deviations
above the mean on average values government redistribution one unit less (on a five-point
scale) in an equal country compared to an unequal country.
Let us now turn to the egalitarian values. Hypotheses H1 and H2 are both supported
by my findings for the values of equality and equity, but H1 is only partially and H2 is not
at all supported by my findings for need. The results for equality and equity are almost the
same (see figures 8 and 9). In very unequal countries, support for both egalitarian values
is high across the income distribution (around 4 on a 1-5 scale): Here, the rich are as sup-
portive as the poor of equity and even slightly more supportive of equality. By contrast,
there is a substantial class polarization around these values in very equal countries: While
the poorest are even slightly more supportive of both values here (around 4.5), the rich are
strongly opposed to both values (the predicted support reaches the lowest possible value
of 1 for an income of around 12). Most of the variation between equal and unequal coun-
tries comes from the rich, who change their values much more as inequality changes. All
of these findings are in line with hypothesis H1. At first glance, it may appear that the fact
that the slope is not negative for highly unequal countries (i.e., that support for both egal-
itarian values does not decline with income here) contradicts H1. On closer observation,
however, it turns out that this pattern in slopes arises from the fact that I graph the results
for countries with the maximum and minimum levels of equality observed in my sam-
ple. Thus, the predicted values for all other countries lie in between these two lines. This
means that, because the slope for unequal countries is only slightly positive whereas the
slope for equal countries is clearly negative, the slope for most countries with an inequal-
ity level in between these extremes will be negative. This is in line with H1.
Unfortunately, the findings for need only modestly support hypothesis H1: Though
my prediction that support for distributing resources according to need will decline with
income is corroborated, the hypothesis that this decline will be smaller in more unequal
countries is only partially confirmed: The interaction term between income and inequal-
ity is insignificant, though the sign has the right direction, and figure 10 shows that the
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Fig. 8: Effect of individual income and country-level inequality on distributing economic re-
sources according to the value of equality. The original scale ranges from 5 (strong support)
through 1 (strong opposition). Inequality is set to the minimum (black thin line) and maxi-
mum (red thick line) observed in the sample. Employment status is set to employed, marital
status is set to married, the dummy variable for female is set to the proportion of women in
the sample. All other variables are set to their mean. The rug plot at the bottom shows the
distribution of income. Confidence intervals were computed by simulation and exclude the
variation of the error term and random effects for country and year.
difference in fact become significant for very large incomes. In other words, the rich are
only slightly more supportive of distributing resources according to need in more unequal
countries. The reason for this weak finding could be that the two items I use to measure
need might not capture this distributional principle adequately: Some people, though they
might agree with the abstract principle that in an ideal world resources what be distributed
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Fig. 9: Effect of individual income and country-level inequality on distributing economic resources
according to the value of equity. The original scale ranges from 5 (strong support) through
1 (strong opposition). Inequality is set to the minimum (black thin line) and maximum (red
thick line) observed in the sample. Employment status is set to employed, marital status
is set to married, the dummy variable for female is set to the proportion of women in the
sample. All other variables are set to their mean. The rug plot at the bottom shows the dis-
tribution of income. Confidence intervals were computed by simulation and exclude the
variation of the error term and random effects for country and year.
according to need, may not agree with the proposal that employers should take need into
account when setting a wage.13
13In particular, upper-class individual are likely to be much more familiar with the workings of the econ-
omy, and are thus more likely to view this suggestion as unrealistic. Though I control for education, which
should partially remedy the resulting bias, this control might be too crude to prevent bias, in particular since
the highest degree obtained measures the educated-ness of a person only with great error (it does not capture
the quality of education as well as subsequent learning on the job, and both of these are highly correlated
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On balance, though, there is a fair amount of support for hypothesis H1, which con-
firms the altruism argument, but is still equally consistent with the argument about the
externalities of crime. To adjudicate between these two arguments, we need to turn to
hypothesis H2. I again find support for it when looking at the two egalitarian values of
equality and equity but not for need. As predicted, the effect of inequality on the values
of equality and equity is much stronger (about 3-4 times as strong) than inequality’s effect
on preferences for redistribution: For the poorest individuals, moving from the most un-
equal to the most equal countries raises the poor’s support for redistribution by around 0.5
but raises their support for egalitarian values by around 1.5. If we look at the rich (defined
as having an income of around 12), this effect is even more striking: While moving from
the most unequal to the most equal countries raises the rich’s support for redistribution
by around 0.75, it raises the rich’s support for equality and equity by around 2.5-3. This
suggests that it is altruism rather than fear of crime (or the consideration of other exter-
nalities) that drives this pattern: If the cause for the rich’s greater willingness to endorse
redistribution in more unequal countries was simply due to these kinds of instrumental
calculations, inequality should have a smaller effect on abstract value such as equality and
equity, because externality considerations are less salient here. However, we in fact ob-
serve the opposite, confirming the altruism hypothesis.14
These findings for need do not support hypothesis H2: The interaction effect be-
tween income and inequality is only marginally significant, and the estimated effect size
is small. This runs counter to my prediction (as well as counter to the findings for equal-
ity and equity) that this interaction (the difference in slopes) should become larger when
with income, even when holding the highest obtained degree constant). Overall, thus, we should look for
alternative measures of need that suffer from less of these problems.
14This still raises the question why inequality has a bigger effect on raising the rich’s agreement with
abstract egalitarian values than their willingness to actually endorse government redistribution. It might
simply be due to the well-known fact that questions that make a trade-off more salient elicit lower support;
thus, since asking about redistribution implies that easing the burden of the poor necessitates some sacrifice
from the rich, the rich are less likely to agree to the question about redistribution. Alternatively, this finding
could mean that the rich’s endorsement of egalitarianism and redistribution declines as the actual costs to
themselves become more real. In the conclusion to this paper I discuss how a study could be designed to
investigate whether their egalitarian values are real or whether they only constitute ”cheap talk.”
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moving from preferences about redistribution to more abstract values about distributive
justice, where instrumental calculations about externalities should play less of a role.
Again, this could be due to the fact that my items that are supposed to measure need do
not capture this value very well.
Finally, I find strong support for hypothesis H3: In unequal countries, the rich are
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Fig. 10: Effect of individual income and country-level inequality on distributing economic re-
sources according to the value of need. The original scale ranges from 5 (strong support)
through 1 (strong opposition). Inequality is set to the minimum (black thin line) and max-
imum (red thick line) observed in the sample. Employment status is set to employed,
marital status is set to married, the dummy variable for female is set to the proportion of
women in the sample. All other variables are set to their mean. The rug plot at the bottom
shows the distribution of income. Confidence intervals were computed by simulation and
exclude the variation of the error term and random effects for country and year.
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less supportive of meritocracy than in equal countries (see figures 11 and 12). The effect
size is substantial, though considerably smaller than for equity and equality: Moving from
the lowest to the highest level of inequality, support decreases by around 0.75 and 1 for
ability and effort, respectively, for people with an income 12 standard deviations above the
mean. This is in line with the altruism argument but contradicts the self-interest argument
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Fig. 11: Effect of individual income and country-level inequality on the value of distributing eco-
nomic resources according to ability. The original scale ranges from 5 (strong support)
through 1 (strong opposition). Inequality is set to the minimum (black thin line) and max-
imum (red thick line) observed in the sample. Employment status is set to employed,
marital status is set to married, the dummy variable for female is set to the proportion of
women in the sample. All other variables are set to their mean. The rug plot at the bottom
shows the distribution of income. Confidence intervals were computed by simulation and
exclude the variation of the error term and random effects for country and year.
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Fig. 12: Effect of individual income and country-level inequality on the value of distributing eco-
nomic resources according to effort. The original scale ranges from 5 (strong support)
through 1 (strong opposition). Inequality is set to the minimum (black thin line) and max-
imum (red thick line) observed in the sample. Employment status is set to employed,
marital status is set to married, the dummy variable for female is set to the proportion of
women in the sample. All other variables are set to their mean. The rug plot at the bottom
shows the distribution of income. Confidence intervals were computed by simulation and
exclude the variation of the error term and random effects for country and year.
(according to which they should rationalize their dominant position by viewing it as de-
served). Surprisingly, while the rich are at least somewhat more supportive than the poor
of the principle of distributing goods according to ability, the rich are in fact less support-
ive of the distributional principle of effort in unequal countries. Though this last finding is
not what I predicted, it suggests that the effect of altruism relative to self-interest is even
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stronger.
Overall, thus, I find support for the theory that it is altruism and not externality con-
siderations that drive the rich’s surprising preferences and values about redistribution.
Most of my hypotheses were confirmed, with the exception of the unexpected pattern for
need. At this point it is not clear whether this is due to the particular way I measured need
(the items I used to do so are clearly less direct measures, compared to equality and eq-
uity), or whether this finding constitutes an actual anomaly.
DISCUSSION
As Rueda and Stegmueller (forthcoming) already noted, these findings stand in ten-
sion with Lupu and Pontussens (2011) famous argument that greater income distance be-
tween groups will make them less likely to have similar preferences. Regarding support
for government redistribution, the opposite seems to be true: The preferences of the rich
are closer to the preferences of the poor and countries in which inequality is greater, not
smaller.
Furthermore, the present findings stand in partial conflict with a recent argument
by Iversen and Soskice (2015) about inequality and political polarization. The authors
show that contrary to what one may believe if one extrapolates from the American con-
text more unequal countries have lower, not higher political polarization. I find this same
pattern here for one of the two main dimensions of political polarization, the economic di-
mension: The greatest polarization around distributive justice in general, and economic re-
distribution in particular, is found in the most equal, not the most unequal countries. How-
ever, my findings are in conflict with the authors more specific findings: They argue that
countries with an inegalitarian distribution of power will both have high inequality (for the
reasons discussed above) and less informed lower-class voters (because of a poorer educa-
tion system for these classes and because of the greater weakness of unions), which makes
it rational to place themselves more in the political center. However, I find that the poor
have similar attitudes towards redistribution and egalitarianism independent of a coun-
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trys inequality. Rather, it is the richs attitudes and values that differ between rich and poor
countries.
While Rueda and Stegmueller (forthcoming) thus reject this argument, as well as the
related argument that the rich are able to distract the poor from the pursuit of their mate-
rial self-interest through focusing on cultural issues (e.g., Tavits and Potter forthcoming), I
think that while there is clearly a tension, it would be fallacious to regard these arguments
as contradictory: In the absence of countervailing pressures on the poor (whether through
poor education or cultural distraction), we would expect the poor to be even more sup-
portive of redistribution and egalitarian values if inequality is higher, since they have even
more reason to adapt attitudes and values in this context (note that self-interest and altru-
ism push in the same direction for the poor). The fact that we observe that the poor exhibit
the same level of support independent of inequality suggests that there must be some fac-
tors at work that curb the support for redistribution and egalitarian values among the poor
in more unequal countries. Iversen and Soskice (2015) and Tavits and Potter (forthcom-
ing) suggest possible causes of what this could be.
CONCLUSION
I have presented this study not as a test whether humans behave at least in part al-
truistically this is best studied using experimental methods, and has already been clearly
confirmed. Rather, the contribution of this paper is to show that political science models
gain in explanatory power if they take this into account. In particular, it explains one im-
portant puzzle regarding the redistributive preferences and egalitarian values of the rich:
Why the rich are less averse to redistribution in more unequal countries.
One limitation of this study like all other studies relying on public opinion polls is
that it is hard to know whether responses are genuine. This question is especially impor-
tant giving the surprising finding that the rich become more supportive of redistribution
in more unequal countries. By contrast to a simple social desirability bias, this problem
is not easily dealt with through asking questions appropriately, because what we would
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really like to know is how people would actually behave rather than what they think and
feel: Given that a single persons opinion is unlikely to change government redistribution,
we do not know whether they would still embrace as egalitarian values if that would re-
quire them to act on them, e.g. by giving away a substantial proportion of their income or
wealth. Of course, a subset of the rich does already engage in philanthropy, but anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that this giving can be for selfish reasons, such as to gain prestige
by conspicuous giving or to buy a highly-increased chance of college admission for their
children.
Future research might be able to address this question by looking at vote choice:
If the support for egalitarian values on the part of the rich is really just cheap talk, then
we should find that egalitarian values become less predictive of vote choice (especially
in elections where that redistributive dimension is salient). However, the possibly insur-
mountable challenge is to control for confounding factors, e.g. the different salience of
economic versus cultural values of voters in different social classes.
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APPENDIX: REGRESSION TABLES
Government Redistribution Ability Effort
Intercept 3.8307∗∗∗ 3.9849∗∗∗ 3.7088∗∗∗
(0.0952) (0.0393) (0.0568)
Female 0.1325∗∗∗ 0.0086 0.0746∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0046) (0.0048)
Age in Decades 0.0632∗∗∗ 0.0119 −0.0173
(0.0141) (0.0088) (0.0091)
Age (in Decades) Square −0.0066∗∗∗ −0.0014 0.0032∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Widowed −0.0671∗∗∗ −0.0087 0.0077
(0.0146) (0.0090) (0.0094)
Divorced 0.0301 −0.0026 0.0319
(0.0275) (0.0166) (0.0174)
Separated −0.0215 −0.0214∗ 0.0069
(0.0170) (0.0104) (0.0109)
Single −0.0823∗∗∗ −0.0078 0.0038
(0.0193) (0.0119) (0.0124)
Education −0.0970∗∗∗ 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Unemployed −0.0605∗∗∗ −0.0151 −0.0059
(0.0150) (0.0088) (0.0092)
Student or Vocational Training 0.0067 −0.0202 0.0182
(0.0174) (0.0153) (0.0160)
Retired 0.1821∗∗∗ −0.0150 0.0374∗
(0.0311) (0.0181) (0.0189)
Housewife/-man 0.0802∗∗∗ 0.0408∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0082) (0.0085)
Permanently Disabled/Sick −0.1253∗∗∗ 0.0080 0.0743∗∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0113) (0.0118)
Other Employment Status 0.0802∗∗∗ −0.0401∗∗∗ −0.0029
(0.0161) (0.0097) (0.0101)
Relative Income −0.1640∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ −0.0095∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0026) (0.0027)
Inequality −0.0125∗∗∗ −0.0075∗∗∗ −0.0123∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Relative Income*Inequality 0.0018∗ −0.0011∗ −0.0021∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005)
AIC 270054.6792 146985.2328 156268.2495
BIC 270252.6173 147180.2544 156463.4686
Log Likelihood −135006.3396 −73471.6164 −78113.1247
Num. obs. 91640 79757 80511
Num. groups: COUNTRY 27 27 27
Num. groups: YEAR 4 3 3
Var: COUNTRY (Intercept) 0.1306 0.0116 0.0353
Var: YEAR (Intercept) 0.0111 0.0017 0.0039
Var: Residual 1.1111 0.3683 0.4061
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 2: Regression results for redistributive preferences and meritocratic values
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Equity Equality Need
Intercept 3.4553∗∗∗ 3.5442∗∗∗ 3.8525∗∗∗
(0.1061) (0.1008) (0.0726)
Female 0.1326∗∗∗ 0.1434∗∗∗ 0.0594∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0073)
Age in Decades 0.0963∗∗∗ 0.0725∗∗∗ −0.1000∗∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0139)
Age (in Decades) Square −0.0107∗∗∗ −0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0014)
Widowed −0.0084 −0.0123 −0.0168
(0.0198) (0.0196) (0.0142)
Divorced 0.0091 0.0057 0.0538∗
(0.0360) (0.0357) (0.0264)
Separated 0.0469∗ 0.0397 −0.0564∗∗∗
(0.0231) (0.0228) (0.0166)
Single −0.0202 −0.0279 −0.0202
(0.0262) (0.0259) (0.0189)
Education −0.0079∗ −0.0269∗∗∗ −0.0909∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0028)
Unemployed −0.0460∗ −0.0122 0.0624∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0202) (0.0139)
Student or Vocational Training 0.0096 −0.0246 0.0690∗∗
(0.0344) (0.0341) (0.0242)
Retired 0.0639 0.1100∗∗ 0.1367∗∗∗
(0.0390) (0.0385) (0.0287)
Housewife/-man 0.0338 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.0494∗∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0130)
Permanently Disabled/Sick 0.0179 0.0126 −0.0179
(0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0179)
Other Employment Status −0.0103 0.0144 0.1116∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0213) (0.0153)
Relative Income −0.0958∗∗∗ −0.0983∗∗∗ −0.1185∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0041)
Inequality −0.0089∗∗ −0.0157∗∗∗ −0.0063∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0017)
Relative Income*Inequality 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗∗ −0.0009
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0008)
AIC 194994.6262 194179.5650 218049.9421
BIC 195183.9588 194368.9366 218244.7963
Log Likelihood −97476.3131 −97068.7825 −109003.9711
Num. obs. 60830 60943 79124
Num. groups: COUNTRY 27 27 27
Num. groups: YEAR 2 2 3
Var: COUNTRY (Intercept) 0.1890 0.1863 0.0971
Var: YEAR (Intercept) 0.0027 0.0009 0.0008
Var: Residual 1.4371 1.4096 0.9174
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3: Regression results for egalitarian values
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